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1. Introduction 
The determinants of the households’ housing tenure choice have been extensively 
analyzed in the economic literature. Among these determinants, from a theoretical point of view, 
uncertainties faced by the households during the planning period have received considerable 
attention. It is well known that housing is a consumption good, for which the amount purchased 
cannot be easily altered in response to fluctuations in income. As a consequence of this lack of 
flexibility in the response to income shocks, uncertainty in future income turns out to be one of 
the most relevant variable in the decision of homeownership. On one hand, borrowers facing 
greater income uncertainty may suffer severe restrictions to access to the mortgage market. On 
the other hand, even if they access to the credit market, it could be expected that risk-averse 
households will try to avoid mortgage downpayments. There are two main sources of labour 
income uncertainty: unemployment and fluctuations in income due to market forces. While these 
uncertainties are usually accounted for in most of the theoretical models, there are hardly any 
empirical tests.  
While theoretical studies tend to provide ambiguous predictions about the effect of 
income uncertainty on the housing tenure decision, the limited empirical evidence using US data, 
suggests that this effect is negative. However, empirical evidence based on one country only is 
not sufficient to disentangle the puzzle. First of all, both renting and property housing markets do 
not behave identically in all developed economies. Consequently, when taking their housing 
decisions, households face different institutional settings (housing, credit and labour market) in 
each country. These institutional differentials may generate not only different attitudes towards 
risk, but also differences in the individuals’ perception of risk in itself, i.e. what is perceived as 
risky in one country is not necessarily perceived as risky in another country.  
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The existing studies of the impact of income uncertainty on the probability of 
homeownership focus on the variance of future expected income1. In this paper, we question 
whether the single use of the variance is enough to draw individuals’ risk attitudes. Some recent 
labour economic literature (see e.g. Hartog and Vijverberg 2002 or Diaz-Serrano et al. 2003) 
shows that individuals appreciate positively skewed income distributions, even if they offer a 
smaller mean. This behavior is due to the fact that in these income distributions the chances of 
reaching high incomes are smaller, but the probability of a big loss is also smaller than in a more 
symmetric income distribution. In other words, great deviations from the mean are less likely in a 
more positively skewed distribution. This phenomenon is called “skewness affection”.  
The hypothesis exposed above is supported by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979, 1991), which states that the individual’s disutility caused by a loss is greater than the utility 
caused by a gain. According to this reasoning, risk-averse households would feel safer in a 
positively skewed income distribution than in a symmetric one, even if the more skewed 
distribution offers a smaller mean. Our conjecture is that risk-averse households exhibiting also 
“skewness affection” are more likely to purchase their dwelling, since their expectation of a 
mortgage downpayment is smaller. Hence, we consider that a suitable income uncertainty 
analysis of the housing tenure choices should account for this effect. In order to capture this 
behavior, besides using the first two moments of the income distribution (mean and variance), we 
propose to expand uncertainty analysis on tenure decisions up to the third moment (skewness). 
We derive this result from a simple theoretical formula and we test it empirically. 
We contribute to the existing literature in two ways. Firstly, we provide international 
evidence about the effect of income uncertainty on the probability of homeownership, which can 
be compared with the limited existing previous evidence from the US. Secondly, by testing 
                                                 
1 This literature will be reviewed in the next section. 
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whether “skewness-affection” is a relevant phenomenon we shed some light in the understanding 
of how homeownership is planed and achieved by the households. To do so, we estimate a 
housing tenure choice model for Germany and Spain using different measures of income risk. 
The reason we choose these two countries for the comparative analysis is based on the fact that 
they represent the two opposite extremes in terms of labour, credit and housing market 
performance among the EU countries. 
Understanding to what extent income (un)certainty, via borrowers’ risk-aversion or 
lending constraints, is a barrier to homeownership has important implications for the design of 
public housing policies and also in the design of private mortgage insurance products. On one 
hand, we ask whether public institutions should subsidize households facing borrowing 
constraints or under a mortgage downpayment risk. And on the other hand, whether the existing 
private mortgage payment insurance market is efficient in first, covering the main households’ 
income risks, and second, offering affordable products to the households who face high rates of 
income risk 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing 
literature. In section 3 we briefly overview the institutional context in Germany and Spain. In 
section 4 we present the theoretical framework used as baseline for our empirical estimation. In 
section 5 we expose the empirical strategy. The data used is described in section 6. Section 7 
reports the empirical results. Finally, section 8 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
 There exist a vast literature that considers uncertainty in the relevant variables 
determining the probability of homeownership. Uncertainties in house prices, in future interest 
rates, in family composition, or in household income is the main focus of this literature. 
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Ioannides (1979) finds theoretical support to the negative relationship between uncertainty in 
housing prices and the propensity to own for risk-averse households. Henderson and Ioannides 
(1983) introduce randomness in the capital gains or loses generated by the investment in housing. 
In their theoretical model they predict that if households can invest in the capital market at a fixed 
rate, renting becomes more attractive than owning. Using macrodata Rosen et al. (1984) show 
that increasing uncertainty in the relative price of housing property with respect to the renting 
costs reduces the share of homeowners in the US. In Neuteboom (2003) a comparison of the 
costs and risks of mortgages for owner-occupiers is offered. He uses the loan-to-income and loan-
to-value ratios to show risks faced by households in the mortgage market among a selected group 
of EU countries. He shows that the risks faced by households among these countries differ 
markedly.  
The studies analyzing the effect of income uncertainty on the probability of 
homeownership are mainly theoretical. DeSalvo and Eeckhoudt (1982) found that the probability 
of unemployment exerts a negative effect on the homeownership decisions. Fu (1995) states that 
under the presence of liquidity constraints the theoretical relationship between income 
uncertainty and housing tenure is ambiguous. Turnbull et al. (1991) also observe an ambiguous 
relationship and point out that labour income uncertainty could have a non-negative effect if 
expected labour income embodies a compensating wage differentials for income risk2. Chung and 
Haurin (2002) specify a theoretical model that also provides ambiguous results. However their 
simulation study shows that uncertainty in future changes in the influential variables would make 
households rent. Haurin and Gill (1987), Haurin (1991) and Robst et al. (1999) find empirical 
                                                 
2 The existence of compensating wage differentials for income risk is well documented in the labor economics 
literature (e.g. King, 1974 and McGoldrick, 1995, for the US, Hartog et al., 2003, for Spain, Germany, The 
Netherlands and Portugal, and Diaz-Serrano et al., 2003, for Denmark). Al these works provide empirical evidence 
that reinforces the ambiguity in the relationship between income uncertainty and home ownership derived from their 
theoretical model. 
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evidence that housing consumption and the probability of homeownership in the US fall when 
income risk increases.  
The studies analyzing the effect of price uncertainty on homeownership, both theoretical 
and empirical in nature, reveal a clear negative effect in this relationship. However, as we show 
above, studies on the effect of income uncertainty on the probability of homeownership, that we 
are interested in, tend to display ambiguous results. Moreover, although unequivocal, empirical 
evidence is still very limited on focuses exclusively on the US housing market. We find this is a 
strong motivation for the present study.  
 
3. The institutional context in Germany and Spain 
3.1. The housing market 
The German housing market is characterized by the largest private rental sector among 
the EU countries (see table 1). The percentage of rented dwellings was about 58% in 1995 and 
57% in 1999. The German housing legislation has historically supported the design of attractive 
policies to promote the renting market. Private landlords enjoy generous tax incentives if they 
offer their properties in the private rental sector, and can receive subsidized loans if they do so in 
the social rental sector. Local authorities also provide an important amount of urban land for 
constructing small social rented flats for the youngest and less favored population. This 
promotion of the rental market is combined with policies that regulate rental prices. Between 
1995 and 1999 the housing cost index for privately rented dwellings increased by around 7% 
only. This scenario explains why in Germany the housing rental market is a strong alternative to 
homeownership. The efficient management of the rental market is translated into stable property 
prices. As a consequence is not surprising that the ratio of renters to owner-occupiers remains 
stable over time. 
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Contrary to Germany, the Spanish housing market displays the highest level of imbalance 
between tenures among the EU countries. The Spanish rental sector is the smallest in Europe (see 
table 1). In 1995, only 14% of the dwelling stock was rented, and this percentage fell to 11% in 
1999. Unlike Germany, in the last decades, Spanish housing policies have been exclusively 
addressed to promote homeownership. Neither the supply nor the demand in the rental market 
has been encouraged in any way. Moreover, the existing 15% personal income tax-relief of the 
household’s renting costs was abolished with the 1998 Personal Income Tax Reform. As a result 
of the lack of incentives for landlords to rent Spain reports the second highest dwelling vacancy 
rate after Greece, slightly above 20%. These inefficiencies in the Spanish housing market have 
also lead to a dramatic increase in rental prices, between 1995 and 1999 the rent index of private 
rental dwellings has risen by 24%. In Spain the lack of supply and its low quality, added to the 
high costs, means that young households prefer to be owner-occupiers than renters, facing an 
aggressively high degree of indebtedness, even in the beginning of their working careers when 
their labour income may not be very stable. This scenario partially explains why the propensity to 
own is so high in Spain. 
 
Insert table 1 here 
 
3.2. The credit market 
During the 1990s, decreasing interest rates and a high competition among lending 
institutions strongly relaxed the accessibility to the mortgage market in Spain. The 10-15 years of 
mortgage payment period was extended to 25-30 years, and the amount borrowed covering 80% 
of the value of the dwelling purchased was augmented to above 100%, covering the value of the 
dwelling, the derived taxes, and the transaction costs. The average pending time between the 
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demand and the concession of a mortgage was reduced from 3-6 months in the early 1990s to one 
week in 2000. The unique requirement the Spanish credit institutions impose on their borrowers 
is that they have an employment. The purchased dwelling serves by itself as a guarantee. 
These practices in the Spanish mortgage market give to credit impaired households access 
to a mortgage loan. Although this is a positive policy, there is no public provision of default 
mortgage protection, and private mortgage insurance products are neither affordable for those 
most at risk nor they offer a wide cover of the risks. Hence, most of these borrowers have a high 
probability of a mortgage downpayment if they experience a negative shock in income. Such 
strong relaxation in the accessibility to the credit market partially explains the “boom” in the 
Spanish housing market, the second greatest after Ireland among EU countries during the late 
1990s. 
On the contrary, the German mortgage market is generally very conservative. The 
borrower still remains liable and the lender has recourse to other assets of the borrower, including 
future earnings. This allows the lender legal recourse to a proportion of the borrower’s salary and 
other income. The ability to seize a portion of the borrower’s earnings from his employer acts as 
a strong disincentive for those households with a relatively high probability of default. Given that 
there is no “exit” option, German borrowers are generally more reluctant to assume and 
aggressively high levels of indebtedness (in contrast with the Spanish ones). For instance, 
between 1994 and 1996 the percentage of households that experienced a mortgage downpayment 
changed from 0.8 to0.5% in Germany, whereas in Spain these numbers moved from 8.2 to 5.6%. 
 
3.2. The labour market 
The poor performance of the Spanish housing market during the 1990s, in contrast with 
the German one, also coincides with a poor performance of the Spanish labour market. Although 
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the unemployment rate has fallen from 23% to 15% between 1995 and 1999, this figure still 
remains the highest in the EU. The consequence of this decrease of the unemployment rate is a 
dramatic increase of the share of fixed-term workers and the precariousness in wages and 
working conditions. On the contrary, Germany has reported relatively stable rate of 
unemployment moving from 8.2% in 1995 to 7.9% in 2000 (see table 1). Another dominant 
feature of the Spanish labour market is the high level of wage inequality. During the 1990s Spain 
reported similar levels of inequality to the US, which has been considered in the last decades as 
the paradigm of the unequal labour market, whereas Germany has reported one of the lowest 
levels of inequality among developed economies3. 
The marked differences in the tenure structures of the housing stock, in the housing 
market policies, in the labour market performance and in the accessibility to the credit market 
between Spain and Germany mean that uncertainty in labour income and attitudes towards risk 
might differ substantially between both countries.  
 
4. Theoretical framework: a simple formula 
The decision of homeownership is usually modeled as a function of household income, 
the costs of owning compared to costs of renting, and a set of demographic variables (age, 
household size, etc.). In this section we develop a simple formula that accounts for the effects of 
labour income uncertainty in the housing tenure choice. We specify a household utility function 
that depends on owning and renting costs and labour income. Labour income is assumed to be 
additively decomposable between a deterministic and stochastic component. For the sake of 
                                                 
3 In a cross-country comparison using the Gini index, Bradbury (1993) reported a level of wage inequality of 0.3 for 
the US and of 0.2 for Germany during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Diaz-Serrano (2001) estimated for the same 
period a Gini value around 0.29 for Spain. 
 8
simplicity, we assume no uncertainty in the rental market4, and that owning and renting are 
mutually exclusive options. This latter assumption is not trivial, since for the most of the 
households is not economically affordable paying a mortgage and a rent simultaneously. A 
household will decide to buy rather than to rent if the expected utility of owning during the tenure 
period T is greater than that the expected utility of renting 
 
0 0
( , ) ( , )
T Tt t
O it R itE U P w e dt E U P w e dt
ρ ρ− −≥∫ ∫% % , (1)
 
where U(·) is the indirect utility associated with owning or renting.  is the real cost of owning, 
 is the real cost of renting, the term ρ is the household’s subjective rate of time preference, and 
w
OP%
RP%
i is the labour income for household i, which is assumed to be 
 
it i itw y ε= + . (2) 
 
In expression (2), yi is “permanent income” and εit is a random term picking up shocks in income 
due to market forces. We assume that ( ) 0itE ε = , 2 2( )itE εε σ= , 3( )itE 3εε κ= , and ( )it iE w y= . 
Future changes in the permanent income are perfectly foreseeable by individuals, whereas future 
changes in the random shocks due to εit are totally unknown. We label this random term, εit, 
transitory shock in labour income. Our assumptions about the signs of the partial derivatives of 
U(∙) are: U , , , , ' 0P < '' 0PU < ''' 0PU = ' 0yU > U ''y 0< , and U . This latter assumption 
guarantees decreasing risk-aversion. As it is pointed out in Tsiang (1974), increasing absolute 
risk aversion is absurd. Therefore, we should expect that a risk-averse individual displays 
''' 0y >
                                                 
4 The consideration of such a class of uncertainty would not alter our key result. 
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preference for skewness in addition to aversion to dispersion (risk) of the probability distribution 
of returns (earnings), so that, we should expect that U . ''' 0y >
''
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where 2 2( )P OE P Pσ = −% O  and 3 (P O OE P Pκ = −%  represent uncertainty (variance) and asymmetry 
(skewness) of owner-occupation costs, respectively.  
)
Applying multivariate first-order Taylor series expansion around y and the point where 
the real cost of renting equalizes the expected price of owning ( RP PO=% ) on the right-hand-side of 
(1) we get 
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where U U  and U . Replacing (3) and (4) in (1) and rearranging yields ' /P O= ∂ ∂ ' /y U= ∂ ∂
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where  is marginal rate of substitution, , and . The term 
 is the household’s absolute risk aversion (see Pratt, 1964), and , by 
analogy to α, is the “skewness affection” (see Hartog and Vijverberg 2002, and Diaz-Serrano et 
al. 2003). According to the previous assumptions on the signs of the first, second and third 
derivatives of U(•), we get that λ
'
1 /PU Uλ =
'/y yU U−
'' ''
2 /PU Uλ = ''' '''3 /PU Uλ =
β =''α = ''' ''/yU U−
1<0, λ2>0 and λ3=0. The latter reduces expression (5) to 
 
3 2 2
2 1
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2 3 P R
P Pε εα βκ λ σ σ λ − − − − ≥  
% 0O  (6)
 
Expression (6) highlights the pivotal role of risk attitudes (α) in the housing tenure 
decision. The decision of owner-occupation crucially depends on the degree of risk aversion α, 
and the difference between expected renting and owning prices ( R OP P− ) . When households are 
risk neutral (α=0), the decision is just limited to real renting costs and household appreciation on 
expected owning costs. However, if households are risk averse (α>0), the decision will also 
depend on the terms in firsts-parenthesis on the left-hand-side of equation (6). With (α>0), labour 
income uncertainty ( 2εσ ) and uncertainty in owner-occupation costs ( 2Pσ ) exert a negative effect 
on the decision to own. In addition, if households exhibit “skewness affection” (β>0), labour 
income skewness ( 3εκ ) raises the probability of homeownership. However, if the gap between 
renting and owning costs is positive and high enough this renting cost effect could remove the 
risk-aversion effect.  
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5. Empirical framework 
5.1. Econometric model 
The difference in the households indirect utility between owning and renting expressed in 
(6) can be represented by a latent (unobservable) index  
 
* 2 3( , , , , , ,i pi i i i i iy f y y c L Hε ε εσ κ= )i
,
 (7) 
 
where f(•) is function of the observable variables 
 
- ypi: Permanent labour income 
- yεi: Transitory labour income 
- σεi2: Labour income uncertainty 
- κεi2: Labour income skewness 
- ci: Owner-occupation and renting cost 
- Li: Employment and unemployment trajectory of the head of household 
- Hi: Household demographic characteristics 
 
We cannot observe the utility of homeownership or renting, only whether the dwelling is 
purchased or not. Therefore, what we observe is  
 
*
*
1 0
0 0
y if y
y if y
= >
= ≤  
 
where  will be estimated by the standard binary choice probit 
model. 
* 2 3( 0 | , , , , , ,i pi i i i i iP y y y c L Hε ε εσ κ> )i
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5.2. Measuring income uncertainty 
Income uncertainty is usually measured by the coefficient of variation (hereafter CV) of 
income. However, although this measure may be a plausible proxy for income risk, it does not 
capture the true individuals’ degree of (un)certainty about their future labour income. We believe 
that individuals have some foresight about their future labour income, whereas the CV assumes 
that individuals have no prospect about it. We find this latter assumption not very realistic. 
Individuals know that their wage depends, among others, on their personal characteristics, skills 
and experience, and they also know the expected value of these characteristics in the labour 
market5. Thus, we assume that the individual’s unforeseeable income is only a share of the 
overall labour income, and it arises from unanticipated shocks due to market forces 
(unemployment, job mobility, business cycle, etc.). 
One clear example of such a source of uncertainty would be workers paid in base to piece 
rate system. Another example would be a salesperson that receives a fix wage plus a commission 
based on his/her turnover. In these two cases workers’ earnings are highly sensitive to production 
or demand shocks. To some extent, the amount of labour earnings received from this type of 
payment systems not only depend on market forces, but also on individual innate abilities, which 
constitutes a permanent source of shocks in earnings. The methodology proposed in this paper to 
compute transitory income permits to separate these individual-specific permanent shocks from 
the transitory ones derived from market forces. Job mobility is also assumed to produce shocks in 
labour income. When a worker is fired because of a negative shock in demand, he/she cannot 
ensure that the wage rate in the next job is going to be as high as in his/her previous job. The 
difference in the wage level between the previous and the current job would represent a shock in 
                                                 
5 We refer to the literature on reservation wages for a deeper insight on this assumption. 
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income. However, individuals will try to ensure that the wage in the new job is at least equal to 
their reservation wage. This reservation wage is determined, among others, by individual’s 
personal characteristics (education, experience, etc.), and its value in the labour market is 
perfectly known. 
Following equation (2) and the assumptions on the degree of knowledge that individuals 
have on their future permanent income, we model individual’s labour income as 
 
ln( )it it i itw X uβ ε= + + , (8)
 
where the subscripts i and t indexes households and time, respectively; ln(wit) is the natural 
logarithm of the individual’s yearly labour income; Xit is a set of explanatory variables referring 
to the household head; ui is an intrinsic individual time-constant shock in earnings6; εit is a time-
varying random shock in earnings; and β is the set of parameters to be estimated. We estimate 
equation (8) using a panel data model with random effects (see Hsiao, 1986, Ch. 4). 
In equation (8), the term it it iy X uβ= +  represents the permanent income7 and it is 
assumed be known ex-ante by individuals, whereas the term itε  is associated with transitory 
labour income, and it is only known after their realization. 
According with the assumptions mentioned above, the labour income variables used in the 
choice equation (7) are defined as follows: 
 
- Individual’s permanent labour income: ( )2000
1994
1 ˆ ˆexp
7pi itt
iy X uβ
=
= +∑  (9)
                                                 
6 This term picks up the individual heterogeneity and it represents a permanent shock in labor income. The panel data 
model (8) allows to purge this specific-individual effect from the transitory shocks εit caused by market forces. 
7 The explanatory variables in Xit are assumed to generate systematic labor income differentials. Individuals know 
the unit price of these variables in the labor market, and hence they can foresee future changes in their permanent 
income 
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- Individual’s transitory labour income: ( )2000
1994
1 ˆexp
7i it
yε tε
=
= ∑  (10)
- Individual’s labour income uncertainty: { }2000 22
1994
1 ˆˆ exp( )
7i itt
iyε εσ ε
=
= −∑  (11)
- Individual’s labour income skewness: { }2000 33
1994
1 ˆˆ exp( )
7i itt
yε εκ ε
=
= −∑ i , (12)
 
where the exponential transformation is applied in order to transfer back to money metric the 
different components of the ln(wit). 
 
6. Data and variable construction 
6.1. The dataset 
The data comes from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). In this paper we use 
the waves covering the period 1994-2000 for Germany and Spain. For the first three waves 
(1994-1996), the ECHP files for Germany contain information coming from both the German 
Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the ECHP, whereas for the period (1997-2000) the whole 
sample comes from the GSOEP. For Spain, all the sample period (1994-2000) comes from the 
original ECHP. The number of surveyed households for Germany ranges from 11,175 in 1994 to 
5,693 in 2000, and from 7,206 in 1994 to 5,132 in 2000 for Spain. Table 2 displays the different 
sample sizes for each wave. The ECHP and the GSOEP contain information not only at 
household, but also at individual level. The household characteristics that we consider relevant 
for the present study are the household size and composition, demographic characteristics, 
income and accommodation. The accommodation questions provide information about the type 
of dwelling, the year when the household moved there, renting costs and mortgage payments.
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Besides household information, we also use personal information (age, gender, etc.) and socio-
economic characteristics (employment status, earnings, education, etc.). 
 
Insert table 2 here 
 
6.2. Sample restrictions 
In order to estimate labour income uncertainty, we restrict our sample to the household 
heads. There are two reasons to impose this restriction. Firstly, as we are interested in income 
uncertainty arising from labour market forces, to calculate income risk we need to keep out other 
sources of household income that tend to display a very transitory nature and that have nothing to 
do with market forces. Secondly, household heads’ labour income is the most important source of 
income for most of the households. Thus, the role it plays in the owner-occupation decision is 
more important than that played by other sources of household income. In table 3 we report the 
share of household head labour income in the overall household income for Germany and Spain. 
 
Insert table 3 here 
 
Our endogenous variable in the tenure choice equation (7) is a dummy variable that takes 
1 if the household is owner-occupier and 0 if the household is a renter. In order to avoid possible 
bias in the estimated effects of the income variables on the probability of homeownership, we 
impose two further restrictions. Firstly, we keep out of the sample the households that have 
purchased the dwelling before the initial survey year, 1994. And second, we do not include the 
households that are recent owners but do not outstand a mortgage. The aim of these two 
restrictions is twofold. On one hand, we do not know the households’ characteristics when de 
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tenure decision is made for those who bought their dwelling before 1994. Hence, restricting 
transitions from renting to owning during the sample period allows matching the observed 
household characteristics with the tenure status decision. On the other hand, the tenure status of 
recent owners without a mortgage outstanding has probably nothing to do with the fundamentals 
and the influential variables assumed to affect the homeownership decision. They may well have 
inherited the dwelling or have received a free allowance out-of-pocket. Although this is a small 
fraction of our sample, keeping these households in the sample could obscure the relationship 
between the income variables and the probability of homeownership.  
 
6.3. Variables 
The matrix Xi used to estimate household head’s labour income equation (8) contains the 
following set of variables; gender, education, labour experience and its squared, tenure and its 
squared, weekly working hours and the type of labour contract. To estimate renting and owning 
costs used in the housing tenure choice equation (7) we use the real average monthly rent and the 
real monthly mortgage payments8 computed for each region (NUTS)9. Permanent income (ypi), 
transitory income (yεI), income uncertainty (σεi2), and income skewness (κε3) are estimated as 
defined in expressions (9) to (12). The remaining variables in the choice equation (7) are defined 
in table 4. Among them, we account for household head’s unemployment history, household size, 
household’s capital income, and some household head’s demographic characteristics such age 
                                                 
8 The literature provides alternative ways to compute the owner costs based on subjective appreciation involving 
mortgage rates, property tax, loan-to-value ratios or house price inflation among others (see e.g. Rosen, 1979; 
Henderson and Ioannides, 1987; Haurin et al., 1994). Because our data lack most of these variables, we proxy the 
owning costs by the monthly mortgage payments. 
9 The NUTS (nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) classification for Germany is Bader-Wuntterberg, 
Bayern, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommem, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarlan, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein, and Thuringen. The Spanish 
NUTS are North-West (Galicia, Cantabria, Asturias), North-East (Pais Vasco, Navarra, Aragon), Center (Castilla-
Leon, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura), East (Catalunya, Valencia, Baleares), South (Andalucia, Murcia), Canarias 
and Madrid.  
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and current marital status. In our choice equation we also control for the type of dwelling 
purchased, and the reason for changing the dwelling if any. 
 
Insert table 4 here 
 
7. Estimation results 
In table 5 we report the sample means for the explanatory variables used in the earnings 
equation (8) and in the tenure choice equation (7). The sample statistics reveals that household 
head’s characteristics determining permanent labour income (schooling, experience, tenure, 
weekly hours worked, and the type of contract) are systematically greater for owners than for 
renters. Therefore, it seams plausible to expect that household head’s labour income profiles will 
display different patterns between both tenures status. To test this assumption, we estimate the 
earnings equation (8) separately for owners and renters. Results are reported in table 6. All 
coefficients are significant at 1% level and with the expected signs. We also carry out a Chow 
test of structural change between both tenures. With F-statistic of 127 for Germany we strongly 
reject the null hypothesis that owners and renters income profiles are equal. In the case of Spain, 
the F-statistic is only 2.52, but high enough to reject the null hypothesis at 5% significance level. 
Hence, for both Spain and Germany, we estimate separated measures of permanent and transitory 
income, income uncertainty and skewness for owners and renters. 
 
Insert table 5 here 
Insert table 6 here 
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Table 7 and 8 contain a descriptive analysis of the intertemporal income uncertainty and 
skewness measures. We include both types of measures, the ones calculated from labour income 
equation (8) and also from the standard formula of the CV and skewness (hereafter K) over 
yearly labour income10. The summary statistics reveal that 2ˆ iεσ , 3ˆ iεκ  posses enough variability to 
look for effects in the choice equation (7). As expected, income uncertainty is markedly higher in 
Spain than in Germany. Time income distributions also tend to be substantially more positively 
skewed in Spain. This result is indicative of the fact that the labour market performance in both 
countries is very different. 
We also find marked intra-country differences between tenures, i.e. systematic lesser 
income uncertainty and greater positive skewness for owners than for renters. In Germany, 
income uncertainty is about 35% greater for renters than for owners, whereas for Spain it is about 
14% greater. Differences in income skewness between tenures are even more important, in Spain 
estimated skewness is six times greater for owners than for renters. The same proportion in 
absolute value is just 2.5 in Germany. Comparisons across population groups also behave 
according to expectations. As we predict in our theoretical formula (6), these results suggest that 
income uncertainty and skewness play a substantial role in the house tenure choices in both 
countries. 
 
Insert table 7 here 
Insert table 8 here 
 
                                                 
10 The standard formula of the coefficient of variation is CV=σy/µy, and for skewness K=Σ(y-µy)3/Tσy3, where µy is 
the time average of yearly income, and σy is the standard deviation. 
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In the second step, intertemporal measures of income uncertainty and skewness are used 
to estimate the effect of earnings uncertainty and skewness on the discrete choice between renting 
and owning, we use a pooled cross-section probit11. Since our data set is a panel, in order to get 
unbiased estimates we select just the last wave the household has participated, and the tenure 
status is determined in that wave. 
Results of the probit estimation of the choice equation (7) are reported in table 9. We 
focus on the results in columns (1) and (2) picking up the effects of the income variables based 
on the residuals of the income equation (8). In both countries we find a strong negative 
relationship between labour income uncertainty and the probability of homeownership. As we 
predict in our theoretical formula, the relationship with earnings skewness is also strongly 
significant and positive. In table 9 we also distinguish between negative and positive shocks. The 
variable called TI2 is a dummy variable that takes 1 if during the sample period (1994-2000) the 
absolute value of the average of the negative shocks is greater than the average of the positive 
ones. This variable exerts a significant negative effect on the probability of homeownership in 
both countries, whereas the effect of transitory income is positive. The average marginal effects 
reported in table 9 reveal that variables related to transitory income (average transitory income, 
uncertainty and skewness) have a markedly stronger effect in Spain than in Germany, whereas 
this is reversed for the effect of permanent income. As a control we also report the estimates 
using the CV as uncertainty measure and K as skewness, both variables are significant and with 
the expected signs.  
The remainder variables in the choice equations also behave according to expectations. 
Employment variables are very important for the tenure status in both countries. Job mobility, 
                                                 
11 The long run nature of housing purchases means that during our sample period households do not experience more 
than one transition from renting to owning. Therefore we discard the use of panel data estimation, since the potential 
improvements provided by this technique do not apply to our case. 
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previous unemployment status and long run unemployment (12 or more months) tend to reduce 
significantly the probability of homeownership. The effect of these variables is, once more, 
stronger in Spain than in Germany. Public employees are more like to own in Germany, but do 
not in Spain. Households possessing greater capital income, and those where the household 
head’s spouse is a wage earner also display a greater propensity to own. User costs are very 
significant and with the expected signs. Consistent with our theoretical formula, the greater the 
owner-occupancy cost, the lower the probability of homeownership. The opposite holds for the 
renting costs. However, this effect is more important across the German regions than in the 
Spanish ones. Concerning the type of dwelling, homeowners show a strong preference for 
detached and semi-detached houses.  
 
8. Conclusions and discussion 
In this paper, we expand the usual income uncertainty analysis (mean-variance) of the 
housing tenure decisions by deriving the effect of the asymmetry (skewness) in the income 
distribution on the probability of homeownership. We use a simple theoretical formula that 
allows determine the crucial role that both variance and skewness in income play on the housing 
tenure choices. In order to test empirically our theoretical results we perform reduced form 
equations estimates of the probability of homeownership in Germany and Spain. Our empirical 
results confirm the predictions derived from the theoretical formula, significant negative effect 
for risk and positive for skewness. This evidence suggests that households are risk averse and 
also exhibit “skewness affection” when they plan their home tenure status. Moreover, our results 
concerning income risk are consistent with previous empirical evidence from the US. 
The alternative measures of income risk and skewness based on the estimated residuals of 
earnings panel data equations have also shown a good performance. This confirms our 
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assumptions about the degree of knowledge that individuals have about their future earnings. We 
also find that unemployment history of the household head exerts a significant effect on the 
probability of homeownership. Household heads that have been unemployed at least once after 
1989 are less likely to own. This effect is augmented if they have experienced long duration 
unemployment (above 12 months). 
The fact that our empirical estimations hold in both countries endows our theoretical and 
empirical results with a good consistency. It is remarkable that even in a so flexible credit market 
as the Spanish, income uncertainty is still a barrier to homeownership. This circumstance has 
significant implications for both public and private institutions. Recently there exist the 
perception that the state pension fund system will experience severe restrictions in the long-run in 
Germany and Spain. To be more specific, the forecast about future demographic evolution and on 
future social security contributions, predict a crash of the Spanish pension system about the year 
2020. Undoubtedly, homeownership is one of the best hedging tools against such a pessimistic 
scenario. In this context, we claim that more active public housing welfare policies, like for 
instance the provision of public mortgage downpayment assistance, are necessary in order to 
promote homeownership among households facing higher rates of income uncertainty. 
In 1999 the German government approved a new insolvency law that relaxed the 
borrower’s degree of liability by allowing himself to declare in “private bankruptcy”. This 
situation permits to an overly indebted borrower solve the outstanding financial obligations by a 
court settlement in case it is not possible do it out of the court. It represents a first step for 
relaxing the extremely conservative German credit market that can encourage to German 
borrowers to assume higher levels indebtedness. Undoubtedly, it is a small door open in order to 
promote accessibility to mortgage loans for those with more volatile income, but maybe not 
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enough to reach a more desirable levels of homeownership that allow most of the households to 
face up to the expected future restrictions in the German pension system.  
The corollary of our results also applies to the existing private mortgage payment 
insurance policies offered by credit institutions. Pryce and Keoghan (2002) find empirical 
evidence for the UK that mortgage borrowers most at risk are less likely to undertake such 
private mortgage insurance products. According to this, it could be that credit institutions need to 
redesign their mortgage protection instruments in order to make it more affordable and cover a 
wider range of households’ financial risks. 
The understanding to what extent the (in)accessibility to a mortgage loan is driven by 
credit constraints or by households’ aversion to the risk of a mortgage downpayment is still a 
relevant question to be answered. This exercise would require suitable data on households’ credit 
quality constraints (see e.g. Rosenthal 2002, or Barakova et al. 2003). It is plausible to expect a 
positive relationship between constraints in the accessibility to mortgage loans and households’ 
income uncertainty in a conservative credit market like the German one, however, but not 
necessarily in a flexible credit market like the Spanish one. Although we find this could be a very 
interesting extension of this work, it surpasses the goals of this paper. Hence, further research on 
this issue is encouraged.  
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Table 1: Selected housing indicators in the EU countries 
 
Unemployment 
rate Rented dwelling
Change in some 
housing costs index Vacant dwellings
 1995 2000 1995 1999 (1) (2) (3) 1991-96 1998-01
Belgium 10% 7% na 23% 4% 2% 48% na na
Denmark 7% 5% 44% 45% 11% 4% 51% 5% 4%
Germany 8% 8% 58% 57% 7% na 28% 3% 8%
Greece 9% 11% na 21% 26% -2% 189% 32% 34%
Spain  23% 14% 14% 11% 20% 23% 142% 15% 20%
France 12% 10% 40% 38% 5% -1% 26% 8% 7%
Ireland 12% 4% 18% 18% na na 170% 10% na
Italy 12% 11% na na 6% na 79% 21% 20%
Luxembourg 3% 2% 26% na na na na 4% na
Nederland 7% 3% 52% 48% 11% 4% 84% 2% 2%
Austria 4% 4% 42% 41% 9% 5% na na na
Portugal 7% 4% na 28% 11% na 236% 11% na
Finland 15% 10% 30% 31% 17% na na 7% 9%
Sweden 9% 6% na na 8% 39% 6% 3% 3%
UK 9% 6% 33% 32% na 38% 84% 4% 4%
Source: CIDIREC (2003).  
Notes: (1) 1995-98 change in the price index for private rented dwellings; (2) 1995-2000 change 
in price index for newly completed dwelling; (3) 1995-2000 change in the index of outstanding 
mortgage loans. 
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 Table 2: Sample sizes by year and data source. 
 # of households # of individuals 
 Germany Spain Germany Spain 
Original
ECHP GSOEP Both
Original
 ECHP
Original
 ECHP GSOEP Both
Original
 ECHP
1994 4,968 6,207 11,175 7,206 9,490 12,233 21,723 17,893
1995 4,688 6,336 11,024 6,522 9,002 12,542 21,544 16,263
1996 4,593 6,259 10,852 6,267 8,746 12,295 21,041 15,640
1997 6,163 6,163 5,794 12,059 12,059 14,819
1998 5,962 5,962 5,485 11,562 11,562 13,779
1999 5,847 5,847 5,418 11,288 11,288 13,104
2000 5,693 5,693 5,132 10,987 10,987 12,317
# observations  56,716 41,824  110,204 103,815
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 Table 3: Share of household head labour income overall 
household income. 
 Spain Germany 
 1995 2000 1995 2000
Percentile     
10 30.4% 31.4% 14.8% 23.3%
25 50.3% 48.2% 31.9% 33.1%
50 73.7% 69.0% 68.1% 64.3%
75 99.6% 98.4% 95.0% 86.2%
90 100.0% 99.9% 98.9% 98.8%
Average 70.6% 68.9% 64.5% 61.6%
Sample size 3,542 1,903 7,386 3,081
Source: Own computations based on the ECHP. 
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Table 4: Definition of some variables in the housing tenure choice equation (6) 
Variable name Definition 
Unemp89 
 
 
Longun89 
 
 
Public 
 
Hsize 
 
Married 
 
MaritalCh 
 
 
Wspouse 
 
Age 
 
Age2 
 
Flat 
 
 
Jobmobil 
 
Permobil 
 
 
Dummy variable takes 1 if the household head has been unemployed at 
least once after 1989. 
 
Dummy variable takes 1 if the household head has been unemployed 
during 12 or more consecutive months at least once after 1989. 
 
Dummy variable takes 1 if the household head is a public worker 
 
Household size (number of household members) 
 
Dummy variable takes 1 if the household head is married 
 
Dummy variable takes 1 if the household head has experienced a 
marital status change after 1994 
 
Dummy variable takes 1 if the household head’s spouse is a wage 
earner 
 
Age of the household head 
 
Age squared 
 
Dummy variable takes 1 if the dwelling purchased is a flat (the 
alternative purchasing option would be a detached or semi-detached 
house) 
 
Dummy variable takes 1 if the change of dwelling is due to job motives 
 
Dummy variable takes 1 if the change of dwelling is due to personal 
motives (the alternative mobility option to this and Jobmobil would be a 
change due to dwelling motives). 
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Table 5: Sample means (1994-2000) 
 Germany Spain 
 Renters Owners Renters Owners
Household head demographics  
Female 0.352 0.219 0.154 0.088
(Age) 40.149 45.773 41.493 46.670
Years of schooling 12.630 13.265 10.610 10.337
(Married) 0.584 0.851 0.687 0.870
Household head's spouse working (Wspouse) 0.490 0.623 0.319 0.343
Household size (Hsize) 
 
2.630 3.200 3.266 3.736
Housdehold head employment  
Labour experience 21.432 27.131 24.115 29.941
Firm tenure 8.390 11.819 9.550 13.778
No fixed-term contract 0.553 0.569 0.356 0.433
Weekly hours worked 41.070 43.218 43.717 45.049
Public worker (Public) 
 
0.203 0.253 0.211 0.188
Household head unemployment  
At least once unemployed after 1989 (Unemp89) 0.319 0.174 0.482 0.337
At least once long unemployed after 1989 (Longun89) 0.142 0.066 0.248 0.151
 
Reason for the last change of dwelling 
 
Job motives (Jobmobil) 0.045 0.007 0.058 0.010
House motives  0.184 0.151 0.139 0.076
Personal motives (Permobil) 0.108 0.039 0.142 0.044
 
Type of dwelling 
 
Detached or semi-detached house 0.171 0.659 0.146 0.338
(Flat) 0.671 0.166 0.845 0.657
 
Occupancy costs 
 
Owner-occupancy costs 619 € 602 € 331 € 326 €
Renting costs 417 € 418 € 170 € 168 €
 
Income  
 
Household head's net yearly labour income 19,456 € 25,553 € 14,338 € 15,533 €
Total household net income 27,847 € 36,648 € 17,225 € 20,689 €
Household capital income 417 € 854 € 286 € 589 €
# of individuals 5,668 3,950 832 4,044
# of observations 20,505 14,770 2,323 16,658
Source: Own computations based on the ECHP. 
Notes: The names in parenthesis refer to the variables defined in table 4. 
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Table 6: Panel data random effects estimates of labour income equation (7) 
 Germany Spain 
 Owners Renters
Pooled 
sample
Owners Renters Pooled 
sample
Constant 
 
8.2875 
(68.91) 
7.7986
(81.57)
7.9459
(107.04)
12.9485
(103.46)
12.0887
(41.04)
12.8522
(111.69)
Years of schooling 
 
0.0399 
(11.92) 
0.0354
(12.93)
0.0375
(17.29)
0.0518
(21.22)
0.0618
(10.18)
0.0518
(22.47)
Experience 
 
0.0152 
(3.90) 
0.0236
(9.23)
0.0242
(11.55)
0.0253
(6.68)
0.0120
(1.93)
0.0241
(7.10)
Experience squared 
 
-0.0003 
(-4.95) 
-0.0005
(-9.33)
-0.0005
(-11.78)
-0.0004
(-7.09)
-0.0003
(-1.95)
-0.0004
(-7.48)
Firm tenure 
 
0.0456 
(12.00) 
0.0773
(24.5)
0.0635
(26.21)
0.0578
(13.07)
0.0831
(7.59)
0.0593
(14.44)
Firm tenure squared 
 
-0.0013 
(-7.75) 
-0.0025
(-18.18)
-0.0020
(-18.53)
-0.0018
(-9.68)
-0.0024
(-5.09)
-0.0018
(-10.46)
log(weekly hours) 
 
0.3774 
(14.05) 
0.4270
(18.44)
0.4039
(23.05)
0.0805
(2.83)
0.2905
(4.04)
0.1050
(3.97)
No fixed-term contract 
 
0.0483 
(5.44) 
0.0502
(6.34)
0.0465
(7.90)
0.1394
(11.31)
0.0912
(2.65)
0.1311
(11.34)
Female 
 
-0.5136 
(-19.23) 
-0.2774
(-15.46)
-0.3775
(-24.17)
-0.3512
(-9.64)
-0.2210
(-3.25)
-0.3320
(-9.99)
# of individuals 3,270 4,242 6,949 3,355 674 3,740
# of observations 11,439 13,490 25,379 13,252 1,784 15,036
Source: Own computations based on the ECHP. 
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Table 7: Estimates of household head’s labour income uncertainty by selected groups 
Income uncertainty and skewness based on residuals equation (7) Income uncertainty based on CV and K on yearly income 
Germany    Spain Germany Spain
Owners        Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters
Mean                S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Total                 0.188 0.253 0.255 0.402 0.336 0.330 0.384 0.402 0.222 0.239 0.261 0.270 0.290 0.258 0.364 0.311
Age group                 
25 to 35 0.172 0.192 0.298 0.481 0.342 0.348 0.476 0.535         0.261 0.268 0.293 0.285 0.292 0.287 0.333 0.314
35 to 45 0.204 0.265 0.254 0.372 0.338 0.316 0.295 0.238         0.210 0.216 0.239 0.254 0.291 0.240 0.351 0.322
45 to 55 0.189 0.327 0.210 0.287 0.354 0.354 0.398 0.391         0.178 0.232 0.208 0.239 0.294 0.255 0.372 0.277
55 to 65 0.151 0.219 0.196 0.375 0.214 0.147 0.263 0.266         0.203 0.237 0.254 0.249 0.185 0.133 0.417 0.324
Sector of 
employment                 
Private 0.205                0.267 0.265 0.384 0.383 0.361 0.437 0.443 0.245 0.249 0.276 0.274 0.334 0.270 0.418 0.319
Public                 0.144 0.209 0.223 0.407 0.197 0.147 0.232 0.184 0.153 0.196 0.203 0.249 0.148 0.142 0.162 0.167
Unemployed. 
after 1989  
  
              
No 0.172                0.245 0.214 0.346 0.294 0.295 0.319 0.412 0.186 0.212 0.209 0.249 0.241 0.238 0.252 0.258
Yes                 0.239 0.273 0.329 0.480 0.392 0.366 0.462 0.379 0.327 0.281 0.349 0.283 0.349 0.270 0.456 0.322
Marital status  
Not married 0.166                0.187 0.264 0.352 0.334 0.339 0.413 0.510 0.198 0.203 0.280 0.283 0.307 0.287 0.399 0.355
Married 0.193                0.266 0.248 0.433 0.336 0.330 0.366 0.322 0.227 0.246 0.248 0.260 0.287 0.253 0.341 0.277
Household 
type
Single                 0.168 0.208 0.239 0.348 0.281 0.210 0.346 0.487 0.191 0.211 0.246 0.262 0.243 0.195 0.403 0.399
Single w. kids 0.122 0.067 0.299 0.372 0.368 0.289 0.304          0.195 0.183 0.222 0.346 0.325 0.291 0.231 0.341 0.284
Couple 0.177                0.226 0.251 0.346 0.365 0.456 0.408 0.500 0.163 0.179 0.266 0.274 0.311 0.326 0.293 0.256
Couple w. kids 0.196 0.272 0.258 0.466 0.331 0.309 0.418          0.364 0.244 0.257 0.250 0.262 0.290 0.253 0.372 0.293
                
                 
Source: Own computations based on the ECHP. 
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Table 8: Estimates of household head’s labour income uncertainty by selected groups 
Income uncertainty and skewness based on residuals equation (7) Income uncertainty based on CV and K on yearly income 
Germany    Spain Germany Spain
Owners        Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters
Mean                S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Total                 0.010 0.198 -0.004 0.260 0,144 0,850 0,022 0,600 -0.010 0.714 -0.091 0.639 0.139 0.704 0.026 0.580
Age group                 
25 to 35 -0.004                0.102 -0.004 0.288 0,125 0,890 0,091 0,602 -0.018 0.665 -0.069 0.610 0.135 0.731 0.035 0.495
35 to 45                 0.022 0.288 -0.006 0.308 0,171 0,886 0,028 0,757 0.025 0.751 -0.069 0.657 0.110 0.660 0.023 0.671
45 to 55                 0.008 0.048 -0.002 0.188 0,181 0,907 0,002 0,505 -0.072 0.715 -0.086 0.662 0.187 0.770 -0.007 0.571
55 to 65                 0.026 0.147 -0.002 0.256 0,016 0,059 -0,080 0,521 -0.003 0.753 -0.189 0.686 0.250 0.732 0.136 0.586
Sector of 
employment 
    
    
        
Private 0.017 0.220 -0.002 0.268 0,175 0,948 0,025 0,657 -0.021        0.706 -0.098 0.643 0.145 0.719 0.013 0.590
Public         -0.010 0.102 -0.012 0.224 0,044 0,353 0,006 0,028 0.023 0.737 -0.067 0.625 0.121 0.656 0.085 0.538
Unemployed 
after 1989  
    
    
        
No 0.012            0.204 -0.004 0.204 0,132 0,748 0,007 0,694 0.034 0.694 -0.059 0.637 0.239 0.711 0.074 0.618
Yes             0.006 0.178 -0.005 0.335 0,159 0,963 0,038 0,489 -0.139 0.758 -0.146 0.639 0.017 0.677 -0.016 0.543
Marital status  
Not married 0.043            0.354 -0.003 0.279 0,145 0,872 0,060 0,610 -0.013 0.680 -0.087 0.630 0.102 0.706 0.072 0.643
Married 0.003            0.140 -0.005 0.245 0,144 0,848 0,001 0,593 -0.009 0.722 -0.094 0.646 0.146 0.704 0.002 0.545
Household 
type 
    
    
        
Single                 0.000 0.040 0.001 0.274 0,202 1,025 0,057 0,671 0.087 0.717 -0.093 0.635 0.021 0.771 0.045 0.676
Single (kids) 0.003 0.008 -0.012 0.302 0,003 0,172 0,149          0,790 0.041 0.656 -0.067 0.643 0.085 0.730 0.284 0.670
Couple 0.021                0.164 -0.003 0.265 0,060 0,635 -0,077 0,517 -0.039 0.696 -0.105 0.621 0.248 0.702 0.020 0.506
Couple (kids) 0.008                0.221 -0.006 0.252 0,161 0,897 0,036 0,570 -0.006 0.723 -0.083 0.651 0.152 0.700 -0.018 0.516
                
Source: Own computations based on the ECHP. 
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Table 9: Probit with robust standard error estimates of the housing tenure choice equation (6).  
 Germany Spain 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cosntant -5.1233
(-6.97)
-5.0171
(-6.86)
-3.7191
(-6.83)
-3.7048
(-6.66)
-1.4037
(-1.44)
-1.6173
(-1.56)
0.5580
(0.55)
0.4789
(0.46)
H. Head labour income 
Income uncertainty -0.6955
(-3.76)
-0.1162
-0.9487
(-4.31)
-0.1565
-0.1815
(-1.65)
-0.0284
-0.1981
(-1.75)
-0.0309
-0.6775
(-2.99)
-0.2634
-0.9163
(-3.35)
-0.3571
-0.4526
(-2.43)
-0.1795
-0.5161
(-2.76)
-0.2047
Income skewness 0.2232
(3.04)
0.0368
0.0751
(1.87)
0.0117
0.2238
(1.87)
0.0872
0.1906
(2.48)
0.0756
Transitory income 0.9384
(3.14)
0.1567
1.4999
(2.91)
0.2474
0.8909
(1.72)
0.3464
1.2747
(2.10)
0.4968
Permanent income/1000 0.0308
(8.05)
0.0051
0.0301
(7.79)
0.0050
0.0001
(1.77)
2.5·10-5
0.0001
(1.65)
2.3·10-5
Average negative shocks greater 
than average positive shocks (TI2) 
-0.2065
(-3.07)
-0.0326
-0.2177
(-3.11)
-0.0338
-0.5518
(-2.05)
-0.2173
-0.6205
(-2.27)
-0.2432
Yearly income/1000 0.0061
(6.70)
0.0009
0.0060
(4.95)
0.0009
0.0001
(2.86)
4.0·10-5
0.0001
(2.74)
3.9·10-5
H. Head characteristics 
(Married) 0.3313
(3.81)
0.0525
0.3352
(3.85)
0.0525
0.4114
(5.38)
0.0605
0.4117
(5.40)
0.0603
0.5238
(3.37)
0.2059
0.5314
(3.37)
0.2091
0.5658
(4.09)
0.2226
0.5871
(3.66)
0.2307
(Age)  0.0542
(1.84)
0.0091
0.0506
(1.70)
0.0083
0.0704
(3.07)
0.0110
0.0698
(2.92)
0.0109
0.0801
(1.65)
0.0311
0.0730
(1.49)
0.0285
0.0179
(0.42)
0.0071
0.0192
(0.45)
0.0076
Age squared -0.0007
(-2.20)
-0.0001
-0.0007
(-2.1)
-0.0001
-0.0009*
(-3.38)
-0.0001
-0.0009
(-3.17)
-0.0001
-0.0011
(-2.07)
-0.0004
-0.0010
(-1.89)
-0.0004
0.0179
(0.42)
-0.0002
-0.0004
(-0.93)
-0.0002
H. Head employment 
Unemployed after 1989 
(Unemp89) 
-0.1863
(-2.65)
-0.0299
-0.1682
(-2.37)
-0.0267
-0.2732
(-4.41)
-0.0405
-0.2634
(-4.21)
-0.0390
-0.0647
(-1.80)
-0.0250
-0.0607
(-1.69)
-0.0237
-0.2671
(-2.26)
-0.1057
-0.2396
(-2.01)
-0.0948
Long term unemp. After 1989 
(Longun89) 
-0.2740
(-3.06)
-0.0406
-0.2862
(-3.16)
-0.0416
-0.2051
(-2.52)
-0.0291
-0.2119
(-2.62)
-0.0299
-0.2802
(-1.89)
-0.1103
-0.2743
(-1.87)
-0.1256
-0.2734
(-1.84)
-0.1087
-0.2938
(-1.98)
-0.1168
Public worker 
(Public) 
0.1271
(1.86)
0.0221
0.1296
(1.88)
0.0223
0.1547
(2.46)
0.0257
0.1538
(2.47)
0.0255
0.0726
(0.56)
0.0281
0.0749
(0.57)
0.0290
0.0992
(0.78)
0.0392
0.0903
(0.71)
0.0357
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Table 9: Continuation 
 Germany Spain 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Household variables 
Capital ncome/1000 0.0185
(2.89)
0.0031
0.0181
(2.79)
0.0030
0.0189
(2.77)
0.0030
0.0187
(3.04)
0.0029
0.0010
(1.86)
0.0004
0.0009
(1.84)
0.0004
0.0011
(1.72)
0.0004
0.0011
(1.71)
0.0004
Household size 
(Hsize) 
0.0504
(1.82)
0.0084
0.0492
(1.78)
0.0081
0.0599
(2.38)
0.0094
0.0597
(2.52)
0.0093
0.0247
(0.51)
0.0096
0.0271
(0.54)
0.0105
0.0213
(0.51)
0.0084
0.0240
(0.57)
0.0095
H. Head's spouse working 
(Wspouse) 
0.1322
(1.98)
0.0221
0.1379
(2.06)
0.0227
0.1527
(2.61)
0.0240
0.1536
(2.61)
0.0093
0.3141
(2.74)
0.1208
0.3289
(2.83)
0.1268
0.2946
(2.81)
0.1159
0.3018
(2.87)
0.1187
Costs 
Owner-occupancy costs -0.0011
(-5.14)
-0.0002
-0.0181
(-5.12)
-0.0002
-0.0010
(-5.67)
-0.0002
-0.0010
(-5.72)
-0.0002
-0.0001
(-3.68)
9.5·10-5
-4.9·10-5
(-3.60)
-1.9·10-5
-4.1·10-5
(-3.19)
-1.6·10-5
-4.1·10-5
(-3.26)
-1.6·10-5
Renting costs 0.0034
(6.16)
0.0006
0.0034
(6.18)
0.0006
0.0031
(6.25)
0.0005
0.0031
(6.41)
0.0005
0.0001
(4.35)
2.9·10-5
0.0001
(4.26)
2.8·10-5
0.0001
(3.67)
2.4·10-5
0.0001
(3.67)
2.4·10-5
New dwelling is a flat 
(flat) 
-1.0844
(-18.18)
-0.2211
-1.0791
(-17.79)
-0.2179
-1.0658
(-19.74)
-0.2082
-1.0664
(-20.17)
-0.2080
-0.7419
(-5.60)
-0.2663
-0.7483
(-5.52)
-0.2694
-0.7298
(-6.01)
-0.2731
-0.7309
(-5.98)
-0.2734
Motive of last change of dwelling 
Job motives 
(Jobmobil) 
-0.4189
(-3.17)
-0.0546
-0.4280
(-3.20)
-0.0548
-0.3993
(-3.15)
-0.0489
-0.4069
(-3.31)
-0.0494
-0.4391
(-2.12)
-0.1736
-0.4214
(-2.00)
-0.1668
-0.4534
(-2.32)
-0.1787
-0.4500
(-2.33)
-0.1774
Personal motives 
(Permobil) 
0.2605
(2.75)
0.0495
0.2263
(2.35)
0.0418
0.2467
(2.97)
0.0438
0.2502
(2.89)
0.0444
0.0956
(0.66)
0.0369
0.1087
(0.75)
0.0420
0.2239
(1.69)
0.0878
0.2352
(1.78)
0.0921
Sample size 3,630 4,749 668 774 
Source: Own computations based on the ECHP. 
Notes:    Endogenous variable: 1 if owner, 0 if renter. 
Columns (1) and (2): Uncertainty, skewness, transitory and permanent labour income estimated 
from income equation (7), and measured as (8) to (11). 
Columns (3) and (4): Uncertainty and skewness measured as the CV and K. 
Z-values in parenthesis; elasticities in italic font.  
The names in parenthesis refer to the variables defined in table 4. 
 
